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EMERGING TRENDS IN CORPORATE
ENFORCEMENT AND CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE: SYMPOSIUM INTRODUCTION
Miriam H. Baer* and James A. Fanto**
Three articles in this volume focus on the topic of corporate
compliance. "Compliance" refers to the complex function the corporation
undertakes to educate its employees regarding relevant laws and
regulations; identify and investigate instances of suspected wrongdoing;
report such wrongdoing to appropriate authorities; and remedy the
situational factors that have allowed such wrongdoing to fester.'
Last February, the Center for the Study of Business Law & Regulation
at Brooklyn Law School hosted a symposium on emerging trends in
corporate enforcement and compliance. This symposium brought together
scholars from a number of different disciplines to talk about compliance's
evolution, both as a field of study and as a governance function. As lawyers
and law students are well aware, compliance has become big business both
inside and outside organizations. Financial institutions and large, publicly
held corporations allocate millions of dollars to their annual budgets for
expenditures on personnel and technology designed to aid them in
identifying and controlling their operational and legal risks.2 These
expenditures exist for good reason: when scandals involving criminal or
regulatory violations erupt and spill into the open, regulators and
prosecutors demand that corporations undertake quick and thorough
internal investigations to identify how violations occurred and why. They
also seek verification that the company made a sincere attempt in advance
to identify the operational and legal gaps that produced these violations.
Finally, prosecutors and regulators increasingly expect corporations to
remediate the factors that caused harm in the first place and to devise
systems to prevent future breakdowns in compliance. Some firms can meet
these demands, often because they have committed to developing a vibrant
compliance program. Many others fall short, particularly when their
compliance program exists only on paper.
The three articles described below were written by professors who
teach either in the legal studies departments of business schools, or in a
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; Senior Fellow, Carol and Lawrence Center
for Business Ethics Research, The Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania.
** Gerald Baylin Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
1. See, e.g., Veronica Root, The Compliance Process, 94 IND. L.J. 203, 220-27 (2019)
(describing compliance as a four-stage process of prevention, detection, investigation and
remediation).
2. See generally William S. Laufer, A Very Special Regulatory Milestone, 20 U. PA. J. BUS.
L. 392, 406 (2018) (observing that compliance-related budgets within very large financial
institutions "are well in the billions").
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university's graduate program in business.3 This comes as no surprise, as
academics across multiple fields have recognized the need to teach and
study what it means for an organization to create and to maintain an
"effective" compliance program. As compliance itself matures into a
lucrative and technology-driven industry, and as firms become responsible
for adhering to ever more complicated domestic and multinational legal
regimes, "effectiveness" becomes an increasingly elusive concept.4 This
poses challenges for practitioners and theorists alike.
Professor David Hess focuses on the ethical components of
compliance. His article begins by asking how a compliance program loses
its legitimacy with its employees. He describes a process of slow
devolution, one in which the company's officers "chip away" at the
program, by creating seemingly small exceptions to rules, which lead in
turn to larger exceptions. The ultimate result, namely the company's
violation of major laws, is often inadvertent and unplanned. In his view,
managers do not set out to dismantle their compliance programs.
Nevertheless, they harm their programs in two important ways. They resist
seeking the input of their firm's chief compliance officers on decisions and
strategies (because, after all, they already know what is ethical and what is
not), and they rationalize and excuse their own and others' misbehavior. By
permitting this unethical behavior to continue, they encourage even more
unethical behavior. According to Professor Hess, a weak "ethical
infrastructure" communicates to the company's employees-even those
with strong ethical inclinations-that the compliance program is toothless.
Misconduct grows more accepted and pervasive throughout the firm.
The final section of Professor Hess's article focuses on how an
organization can protect the compliance program's legitimacy. He lays
primary responsibility for this on the corporation's board of directors and
argues that directors should take a more active role in overseeing the
company's compliance program. Second, he advocates that the chief
compliance officer position should be separate from and independent of the
company's general counsel. Although many firms combine the chief
compliance officer and general counsel positions, Professor Hess believes
that the compliance program's legitimacy is more easily protected when the
chief compliance officer is independent and reports directly to the
company's board.
3. Professor Hess is a Professor of Business Law at the Stephen M. Ross School of Business
at the University of Michigan. Professor Park is an Associate Professor of Business Law and
Satell Fellow in Corporate Social Responsibility and Co-Director of the Corporate and Regulatory
Compliance Graduate Program at the University of Connecticut. Professor Pacella is an Assistant
Professor of Business Law and Ethics at Indiana University, Kelley School of Business.
4. See generally Root, supra note 1, at 212.
5. David Hess, Chipping Away at Compliance: How Compliance Programs Lose Legitimacy
and Its Impact on Unethical Behavior, 14 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 5 (2019).
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Professor Jennifer Pacella's contribution explores the important topic of
enforcement actions brought against, and the resulting liability of, corporate
compliance officers.6 On the one hand, she observes that this enforcement
activity underscores the importance that regulators and enforcement
officials attach to compliance officers: compliance officers are seen to be so
significant in an organization that they have to be above reproach. On the
other hand, as she also notes, there is a danger arising from aggressive
enforcement against compliance officers if the latter are held legally
responsible simply because a serious legal violation occurs in an
organization. This broad legal responsibility could lead compliance officers
to ask that their organizational role be clearly limited, which could,
perversely, undermine organizational compliance.
A related contribution that Professor Pacella makes in this article-
which echoes an insight of other scholars-is that the uncertain professional
position of compliance officers, which allows organizations to ask them to
fulfill other organizational roles than compliance, contributes to their
enhanced risk of legal liability, as noted above. That is, she observes that
there is no self-regulation of compliance officers because state authorities
do not recognize the field as a bona fide independent profession. This leads
to confusion over the exact position and role of compliance officers in an
organization.
As Professor Pacella has written elsewhere, lawyers acting as
compliance officers arguably provide a "law-related service" that would
require them to comply with the legal profession's model rules of
professional conduct.7 But compliance is not a recognized part of the legal
profession and thus exists in a kind of unprotected professional limbo. She
also observes that under whistleblower laws, compliance officers are not
legally protected from retaliation for raising concerns or evidence of legal
violations "up the chain" in the organization, which has the perverse effect
of depriving them of this protection for a task that they are expected to
perform. She thus calls for a clarification of both the role of compliance in
an organization and of compliance's professional status with respect to
other professions, all of which could improve the position of compliance
officers and make for more effective compliance.
Finally, Professor Stephen Kim Park's article explores the intersection
between corporate compliance and corporate social responsibility (CSR).'
Whereas corporate compliance ensures the company's compliance with the
law, corporate social responsibility addresses its position on issues of
6. Jennifer M. Pacella, Compliance Officers: Personal Liability, Protections, and Posture, 14
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 23 (2019).
7. Jennifer M. Pacella, The Regulation of Lawyers in Compliance, 95 WASH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020).
8. Stephen Kim Park, Social Responsibility Regulation and Its Challenges to Corporate
Compliance, 14 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 39 (2019).
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broader societal concern, such as the environment, human rights, and
inequality. Professor Park's key observation is that a "small but growing
number of regulatory mandates are emerging that impose obligations on
companies to pursue, monitor, investigate, disclose, mitigate, or otherwise
address CSR-related concerns."9 According to Professor Park, these
mandates (many of which emanate from foreign countries) either will force
firms to create new internal governance mechanisms or instead re-shape the
firm's already existing compliance program.
As Professor Park wisely points out, CSR compliance poses a number
of challenges for the corporate risk function. It complicates the company's
assessment of its compliance program's effectiveness, particularly, insofar
as multinational corporations operate in many jurisdictions and rely on a
complex web of third parties to make a given product. It also enlarges the
sources of legal authority of which a firm must be aware, thereby leading to
"fragmentation" and uncertainty as to the firm's overall legal obligations.
CSR compliance also potentially exacerbates a firm's compliance mission,
such as when employees disagree with the company's CSR mission that is
not mandated by law.
How does one navigate this tricky environment? Professor Park leaves
that question for later scholarship and proposes that this contextualized
portrait of "CSR-meets-compliance" should form the beginning of a longer
conversation between academics and compliance practitioners.
Each of these three articles demonstrates in its own way how
compliance has grown as a discipline and how compliance scholarship
increasingly relies on a sophisticated understanding of how business
organizations strive (and fail) to maintain ethical cultures, adhere to
overlapping and potentially conflicting laws, and navigate difficult legal
and professional boundaries. These authors usefully add their insights and
research to a compliance conversation that has become robust and
sophisticated, and which we expect will continue to evolve for quite some
time.
9. Id. at 40.
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